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A cold War thaw in the International Working 
class Movement? the World Federation of trade 
Unions and the International confederation  
of Free trade Unions, 1967–1977 
VIctoR G. DeVInAtZ
ABSTRACT: The International Confederation of Free Trade 
Unions (ICFTU) emerged from the World Federation of Trade 
Unions (WFTU) in 1949 after Western trade union affiliates in 
the latter organization expressed major policy differences over 
the Marshall Plan. For its first 20 years, the ICFTU refused all 
forms of collaboration with the WFTU, contending that the Fed-
eration advocated a politically monolithic Communism with its 
primary function being the promotion of Soviet policy. The ICF-
TU’s position was disingenuous, given the WFTU’s polycentric 
nature encompassing variants of Communist theory and practice 
dating back at least to October 1965. Moreover, even when the 
WFTU Secretariat condemned the August 1968 Soviet invasion 
of Czechoslovakia, the ICFTU still refused cooperation. While a 
minor thaw between the ICFTU and the WFTU occurred during 
the early through the late 1970s, it was, at best, tentative, minimal 
and inconsequential.
A T THE START OF THE TWENTy-FIRST CENTURy’S  second  decade, with unions under attack in virtually all corners of  the world, it is crucial for labor historians to try to better com-
prehend the history of the global obstacles to achieving working-class 
solidarity. Issues dividing working-class organizations remain a central 
issue in labor historiography that has largely been unexplored. This 
article attempts to understand the worldwide barriers to international 
working-class unity at the highest levels of global labor movements in 
the middle to latter part of the 20th century.
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Such obstacles date to the origins of the First International (1864–
1876), which sought to bring together socialist and anarchist political 
groups and trade unions for advancing the class struggle. After a major 
dispute between Marx and the anarchist Bakunin over working-class 
political action resulted in the expulsion of Bakunin and some of 
his followers in September 1872, the General Council of the First 
International was transferred to New york where internal disputes 
occupied the organization until its dissolution a few years later. The 
Second International (1889–1916), comprised of socialist and labor 
parties, crumbled during the First World War when these political 
parties abandoned the international proletariat and supported their 
own nations’ war efforts (Lorwin, 1953, 13–15, 28–30).
By the late 1890s, unions in the same trades and industries 
throughout the world joined together in International Trade Secre-
tariats (ITSs) to advance their interests in an increasingly globalized 
world. A majority of these Secretariats’ national members were social-
ist, as were the ITSs themselves. However, most of the Secretariats’ 
work dealt with practical concerns, emphasizing the improvement 
of wages and working conditions. By 1914, approximately 30 ITSs 
had been created, with most based in Germany (Dreyfus, 2000, 39; 
Windmuller, 1954, 4).
In August 1901, the International Secretariat of National Trade 
Union Centers (ISNTUC) was established among predominantly 
European trade union confederations, to motivate the establishment 
of national federations in industrialized nations. At the group’s last 
conference prior to World War I in 1913, the ISNTUC renamed itself 
the International Federation of Trade Unions (IFTU). As with the 
Second International, the IFTU’s work was suspended during the 
War when each nation’s labor movement patriotically supported its 
own government’s war efforts. The IFTU was reconstituted in 1919 
after the War, as was the Second International in 1923 as the Labor 
and Socialist International (Goethem, 2000, 83; Dreyfus, 2000, 61; 
Windmuller, 1954, 8, 11).
The Russian Revolution of 1917 led to another rupture in inter-
national trade union unity. In order to promote the spread of revolu-
tion in Western Europe as well as throughout the world, the Soviet 
Union and other Communist Parties established the Third Inter-
national (Communist International), as a vehicle in opposition to 
the Second International (Socialist International). Affiliated to the 
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Communist International were a number of subsidiary organizations, 
one of which was the Red International of Labor Unions (RILU), also 
known as the Profintern. Beginning as a trade union international 
which included revolutionary syndicalists as well as Communists, the 
Profintern increasingly came under Communist control, while the 
largely social-democratic unions were divided between the Interna-
tional Federation of Trade Unions (IFTU) and the more established, 
industrially-specific federations, the ITSs. These divisions made inter-
national unity increasingly difficult (Goethem, 2006, 8; Carr, 1953, 
207, 399–400).
By 1928, believing that capitalism was heading towards crisis 
and ready to be overthrown, the RILU called for the formation of 
revolutionary dual unions under Communist control, whenever and 
wherever this could be accomplished. However, with Nazism’s rise 
in Germany in 1933 and the danger of fascism spreading to other 
European countries in 1934–1935, the Profintern advocated that the 
revolutionary unions be abandoned and that Communists return 
to the national trade union movements for building united fronts 
between Communists and Socialists in advancing the trade unions 
and defending political democracy within the industrialized capitalist 
nations. When an IFTU delegation visited Moscow and rejected the 
Red International’s request for merger in November 1937, the RILU 
was abolished on December 27, 1937 (Tosstorff, 2003, 92).
When the allied powers achieved victory over fascism in 1945, it 
appeared that international trade union unity, which had been elu-
sive between the two great wars, might actually be achieved with the 
founding of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) in Octo-
ber 1945. The unity first expressed in the WFTU was short-lived. An 
emergent rift occurred between the Western trade union federations, 
led by the United States’ industrial-oriented Congress of Industrial 
Organizations (CIO) and the British Trades Union Congress (TUC), 
and the Communist-led union federations in the Soviet Union, Central 
and Eastern Europe, France, Italy, Latin America and Asia.
With the increase of Cold War tensions continuing throughout 
the late 1940s, the Western and non-Communist-led union federations 
left the WFTU in 1949 and formed the International Confederation 
of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). One defining characteristic of the 
Confederation for the first 20 years of its existence was its adoption of 
virulently anti-Communist stances, combined with refusal to work with 
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Communist-led union federations in both socialist and capitalist coun-
tries. By taking such positions, the ICFTU’s politics became aligned 
for all practical purposes with the practices of the anti-Communist 
Cold War forces.
By 1973, although the ICFTU retained its anti-Communist ori-
entation, its positions towards the WFTU had softened a bit. At this 
time, because of détente and the Confederation’s commitment to 
world peace, combined with divisions having appeared “in the mono-
lithic structure” of the Communist nations, in the Confederation’s 
own words — this was given as the ICFTU’s major reason for the 
policy change — the Confederation argued that affiliates could par-
ticipate with WFTU members, contingent on particular circumstances 
(ICFTU, 1973b, 1).
Although articles and books have been published concerning 
the breakup of the WFTU during the “early” Cold War period (e.g., 
Weiler, 1981; Carew, 1984; McShane, 1992), this paper breaks new 
ground in dealing with the complex relationship between the WFTU 
and the ICFTU during the “middle” Cold War years. I will argue that 
the ICFTU’s position was disingenuous, myopic and ultimately guided 
by Cold War politics, given that the WFTU was not a monolithic, 
but a polycentric, organization which included a number of variants 
of Communist theory and practice dating back at least to October 
1965. Furthermore, even after the WFTU demonstrated independence 
from Moscow when its Secretariat condemned the Soviet invasion of 
Czechoslovakia in August 1968, the ICFTU still refused collaboration 
in any manner with the Federation. Finally, I contend that, although 
the WFTU was guided by politics as was the ICFTU, its appeals to 
cooperating with the Confederation were class-based, aimed at aid-
ing the working class of the capitalist nations. However, the ICFTU’s 
anti-Communism appeared to override these class appeals, preventing 
the Confederation from working productively with the WFTU in any 
manner whatsoever.
A Brief History of the WFTU and the 1949 Organizational Split
“The formation of the World Federation [of Trade Unions],” 
according to Victor Silverman (2000, 13), “marked a high point of 
the world working class movement.” With Socialists and Communists 
joined in struggle and achieving victory over fascism in the Second 
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World War, the world labor movement was united for the first time in 
over two decades. Hope remained high that this unity could be main-
tained in the reconstruction of the industrial economies devastated 
during the war, and that the international labor movement would 
transform the world in labor’s image. Such unity remained illusory 
and by mid-century two competing trade union internationals existed, 
each claiming to best represent the interests of the world’s workers. 
As Silverman (2000, 13) notes, the splitting of the WFTU destroyed 
“the last chance for a worldwide social transformation created by the 
working class.”
Although the self-reported role of the USSR’s All Union Central 
Council of Trade Unions (AUCCTU) was that of a “transmission 
belt” for socialism within the Soviet state, throughout the war in 
Western countries there emerged a tripartite cooperation between 
labor, capital and the state in gearing up industry for the war effort. 
Furthermore, in the United Kingdom and the United States produc-
tion during the Second World War served as an economic stimulus 
for ending the Great Depression with a concomitant increase in 
the power of the industrial unions. As such, it was believed that 
not only would labor continue to play a major role in rebuilding 
economies but it would also help to create liberal or social democra-
cies in the liberated nations. Additionally, there was a commitment 
among trade union leaders in the Soviet Union, Great Britain and 
the United States that organized labor would play an instrumental 
role in encouraging world peace (Kofas, 2002, 28). It was within these 
hopeful conditions that the World Federation of Trade Unions was 
launched in Paris in October 1945.
At the founding congress, 346 delegates representing 64 million 
trade unionists, gathered and issued statements denouncing fascism, 
war, colonialism, discrimination and racism while calling for extend-
ing the rights of unions, improving working and living conditions as 
well as restricting and eliminating monopolies. Up to 1945, the WFTU 
“was the largest and most geographically extensive of any international 
trade union organization” (Herod, 1997, 167) that the world had 
seen. Although the CIO represented U. S. industrial workers, notably 
absent was the craft-oriented American Federation of Labor (AFL) 
due to its intense rivalry with the CIO, its ideological underpinnings of 
corporatism and business unionism, and its desire to play the leading 
role in any international labor grouping (Kofas, 2002, 23).
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While there have been several treatments of the short history of 
the WFTU and the events leading up to the split, which are beyond 
dispute, there is disagreement over the causes of the rupture (Kofas, 
2002; Carew, 1984; Weiler, 1981). According to Weiler (1981, 1), after 
the Western unions left the WFTU, these labor organizations’ leaders 
put the entire blame on the Soviets, arguing that their aim was to use 
the federation to advance the Soviet Union’s foreign policy interests. 
Additionally, the Western unions contended that while the Commu-
nist-led unions fought for objectives desired by the Soviet state, their 
own labor organizations were autonomous of government interfer-
ence. However, archival research by international labor scholars from 
the 1980s through the 2000s has resulted in more nuanced positions.
Carew (1984) argues that the AFL, the TUC, the U. S. and British 
governments, respectively, are primarily responsible for the WFTU’s 
breakup, because these American and British trade union combina-
tions hoped to create an international trade union federation more 
sympathetic to the foreign policies of their own governments. Never-
theless, Carew (1984) also blames Communists for the split, arguing 
that they utilized the WFTU administrative machinery to pursue their 
own interests. Weiler (1981) contends that primary responsibility 
for the WFTU schism should be placed on the AFL’s and the U. S. 
government’s shoulders because they worked actively towards the 
Federation’s destruction. According to Weiler (1981), even though 
the Soviets benefitted from affiliation with the WFTU, they did not 
aim to dominate it but sought cooperation with the Western trade 
union national centers. Finally, Kofas (2002) claims that although 
the WFTU’s break-up was inevitable due to U. S.–Soviet tensions and 
that the Federation was controlled by the Soviet Union by 1950, this 
could not be claimed at the time of the WFTU’s founding in 1945.
The unity first expressed in the WFTU began to fray when it was 
exposed to pressures external to the organization. Although the fed-
eration attempted to portray itself as a unified organization, issues 
arose concerning differences in ideology, views of trade unionism, 
political practices, and degrees of economic development of the 
member nations. With rising Cold War tensions between Moscow 
and Washington in 1946, some WFTU members continued to support 
a Popular Front strategy, while the CIO and TUC were pressured to 
fall in line with their governments’ foreign policy. One year later in 
a meeting between Dean Acheson, the U. S. undersecretary of state, 
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and CIO leaders, Acheson argued that the Soviet Union was using 
the WFTU to attain its own political goals and had a different vision 
of trade unionism than that possessed by the CIO. Even though more 
than half of the federation’s affiliates were pro-Soviet, Moscow did not 
want to jeopardize international labor unity by promoting policies 
that would be opposed by the CIO and the TUC. Nevertheless, the 
Soviets offered a resolution opposing the expansion of U. S. policies 
and business interests while passing a motion that called for expand-
ing the rights of colonial peoples, a position opposed by the United 
States, Great Britain and France (Kofas, 2002, 35, 43, 46).
This schism was primarily caused by the execution of the U. S. 
Marshall Plan in 1947, designed to rebuild the Western European 
economies in the postwar era, which the Communist-bloc unions 
viewed as a way for the United States to obtain political and economic 
hegemony over the region. Moreover, these unions blamed the pro-
business AFL for using the Plan to undermine unity within the WFTU 
(Kofas, 2002, 51). And that specifically was the AFL’s strategy. This 
U. S. labor federation sought a new international trade union organiza-
tion to carry out the Marshall Plan, to be comprised of only Western 
unions and envisioned as becoming the core of a new international 
labor grouping (Weiler, 1981, 16).
And that is exactly what happened. The Western unions estab-
lished the European Recovery Program Trade Union Advisory Com-
mittee (ERPTUAC) in March 1948 for administering the Marshall 
Plan which one year later become the nucleus of the anti-Communist 
ICFTU. With the Western unions rallying around ERPTUAC, the 
Communist-led unions supported the Soviet Union with the French 
General Confederation of Labor (CGT), the Italian General Con-
federation of Labor (CGIL), and the Soviet and Eastern European 
union federations condemning the Marshall Plan as a U. S. imperialist 
adventure (Weiler, 1981, 18).
In spite of this wedge between the Communist-led and the West-
ern unions in the WFTU caused by the Marshall Plan, at the WFTU’s 
next major get-together in May 1948, the Soviets made concessions in 
order to keep the Federation from losing affiliates. Besides limiting 
the general secretary’s power and placing restrictions on what could 
be published in the WFTU Information Bulletin, the Soviets also allowed 
each national trade union center to adopt its own position with regard 
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to the Marshall Plan. But it was too late: the CIO and the TUC were 
already committed to leaving the organization (Weiler, 1981, 19).
The ICFTU’s Formation and the Organization’s 
Early Years, 1949–1954
By the time of the ICFTU’s founding conference in London on 
November 28, 1949, both the world and the international labor move-
ment had changed dramatically. As the Cold War enveloped the globe, 
European nations were partitioned into what Carew (2000, 189) refers 
to as “two armed camps,” with each one pursuing the construction 
of divergent economic systems. This situation was mirrored in the 
international trade union movement, with distinct labor organizations 
established in Germany’s two halves and an enduring division arising 
from the 1947 split in the French labor movement. Similar develop-
ments occurred in Italy with the launching of vigorous attempts to win 
social democrats and socialists away from the Communist-led CGIL. 
Further north, the Socialists and Communists battled for domination 
in the Finnish trade union movement (Carew, 2000, 189).
With 261 delegates representing 63 national trade union cen-
ters, a constitution was adopted which defined “free trade unions” as 
labor organizations “independent of any external domination” for the 
purpose of serving as “free bargaining instruments . . . which derive 
their authority from their members.” Affiliated organizations were to 
achieve their goals primarily through collective bargaining and would 
only “seek government assistance” when negotiation failed. Although 
many members were allegedly socialist or social democratic in orien-
tation, no links existed to the Socialist International as such (Carew, 
2000, 196–7). The ICFTU’s 1949 manifesto, entitled “Bread, Peace 
and Freedom,” expressed the Confederation’s three key objectives: 
to deliver “bread” to hungry workers in Europe, “peace” to the world 
as opposed to Communist aggression and “freedom” from attempts 
to impose totalitarianism on allegedly democratic labor organizations 
(Windmuller, 1966, 360). In order to demonstrate the ICFTU’s osten-
sible independence from both Communism and capitalism, confer-
ence attendee and United Auto Workers president Walter Reuther 
invoked the slogan, “Neither Stalin nor Standard Oil” to describe the 
Confederation’s orientation (Sturmthal, 1950, 376).
G4192.indd   349 5/9/2013   12:22:33 PM
350 SCIENCE & SOCIETy
From its inception, there were tensions within the ICFTU between 
industrialized and developing countries as well as with the largest 
national trade union centers, such as the TUC and the AFL, because 
these members were much more likely to support their governments’ 
foreign policies. In order to protect the unity of the Confederation 
from dominance by any one of the largest affiliates, Brussels was des-
ignated as headquarters, and leaders were to be selected from the 
smaller members (Carew, 1996b, 121–122).
While the WFTU aggressively opposed fascism, the ICFTU com-
mitted itself to struggle against what it considered to be “all forms 
of totalitarianism — communist, fascist, phalangist, corporative or 
militarist,” and stated that it would attempt to prevent “the infiltra-
tion of labor organizations by totalitarian forces.” However, not all 
representatives, especially those from developing countries, agreed 
that Communism posed as serious a threat as seen by the ICFTU. 
The Indian National Trade Union Congress (INTUC) representative, 
Phany Ghosh, claimed that too much concern existed with regards 
to “the spread of Communism,” and if the major goal of the ICFTU 
was to encourage anti-Communism throughout the world, he did 
not want to be affiliated with the organization. Arturo jauregui of 
the Confederación de Trabajadores del Peru (CTP) and Hermes 
Horne of the Comité de Coordinación de Sindicatos Autónomos 
(CCSA) adopted similar positions, arguing that anti-Communism was 
used as the primary weapon to weaken and tame labor movements. 
They claimed that military dictatorship, not Latin American Com-
munism, was the major problem confronting the region’s workers 
(Carew, 2000, 197).
But even within the affiliates from the industrial nations there were 
differences in how anti-Communist tactics should be implemented. 
The AFL, for example, felt that the social-democratic European mem-
bers were not aggressive enough in their anti-Communism while the 
Europeans, for their part, were dismayed at the crude practices of 
the AFL’s semi-autonomous Free Trade Union Committee (FTUC) in 
combating Communism, which the Europeans suspected was funded 
by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). For its part, the CIO took 
the side of the Europeans and the ICFTU leaders against the AFL on 
this issue. At the time of the AFL-CIO merger in 1955, CIO officials 
such as the autoworkers’ Walter Reuther hoped that the AFL leaders 
such as George Meany would be won over to the CIO’s foreign policy 
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positions, but Meany remained as much of a zealous Cold Warrior as 
ever (Carew, 1996b, 124–125).
These tensions could be seen at the ICFTU’s Milan Congress in 
july 1951 and at the Confederation’s Executive Board meeting that 
November. At the first gathering, the AFL introduced a resolution on 
“totalitarianism” which emphasized the harm that Communism posed 
to “free trade unions and to democratic countries” (Windmuller, 1954, 
188). In Committee, the resolution was altered to include “the danger of 
right-wing totalitarianism,” indicating that the Europeans did not view 
Communism as the sole threat to free trade unionism throughout the 
world (Windmuller, 1954, 187–188). At the Executive Board meeting 
later that fall, the AFL introduced a resolution calling on the ICFTU to 
defend yugoslavia from all forms of Soviet aggression while condemn-
ing that nation for its anti-democratic regime in addition to calling for 
reestablishing free trade unions in yugoslavia. When the motion failed 
to be seconded, the AFL harbored suspicions that the ICFTU was not 
sincerely dedicated to battling Communism (Windmuller, 1954, 200).
As Carew (2000, 201) has emphasized, “more than anything else, 
anti-Communism was the dominant theme in most of the Confedera-
tion’s early programs.” A portion of this activity was directed towards 
exposing Soviet forced labor, as indicated, for example, through the 
publication of Stalin’s Slave Labour Camps in 1951. Although the ICFTU 
downplayed these efforts, further involvement focused on under-
mining the French and Italian Communist dockworkers’ attempts 
to thwart the arrival of U. S. armaments in Europe. The most active 
arena for this work occurred in the Mediterranean ports where a 
French trade unionist, Pierre Ferri-Pisani, led these efforts. While 
having ties to organized crime, Ferri-Pisani worked intimately with the 
AFL’s notorious Cold Warrior and agent provocateur Irving Brown 
who financed the operation with CIA funds.
Although the WFTU and the ICFTU traded insults after the ICF-
TU’s formation in 1949, the WFTU approached the ICFTU in july 
1951 about meeting so that joint work could be undertaken in “defense 
of the workers’ vital interests” (Lorwin, 1953, 281). The overture was 
rejected by the ICFTU’s Executive Board; the subsequent 1951 Milan 
Congress approved a sharply worded rejection to the WFTU. Neverthe-
less, at the WFTU’s General Council meeting in Vienna in November 
1951, a second proposal was tendered to the ICFTU for collaboration, 
to which the latter never responded (Lorwin, 1953, 280–281).
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While the ICFTU formally claimed independence, its ties to the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) show that, in reality, 
the organization was organically linked to the Western power bloc. 
The ICFTU’s Ted Thompson was in daily contact with the NATO 
Secretariat. Furthermore, with the appointment of Lord Ismay as the 
first NATO Secretary General in 1952, the ICFTU General Secretary, 
jacobus Oldenbroek, met with him to discuss the two organizations’ 
ongoing relationship and common interests. That same year, the 
ICFTU organized a conference of NATO country members for the 
discussion of defense and armament programs. Although the ICFTU 
argued that NATO should only engage in defensive maneuvers and 
that it was against any forms of NATO aggression, the Confederation 
called “for rearmament which took account of workers’ interests” 
and stressed the necessity of full employment with the conversion of 
economies to arms production (Carew, 2000, 205–6).
The ICFTU’s Position on Dealing with Unions 
in Communist Nations, 1955–1967
During this 12-year period, the ICFTU took a very hard line with 
regards to its affiliates dealing with any WFTU members. Although 
its stance remained fairly consistent throughout this period, its policy 
did change in subtle ways as the WFTU’s activities evolved over time. 
For the most part, the ICFTU argued that the WFTU unions were 
only interested in promoting Soviet policy and had no interest in 
improving the lot of the international working class.
The major motivation behind the ICFTU’s adoption of an official 
policy concerning affiliates’ relations with unions from Communist 
countries was “the peace offensive” launched by “Soviet bloc leaders” 
after Stalin’s death in 1953. At this time, the Eastern trade unions 
tendered visitation offers to their Western counterparts (Carew, 2000, 
245). The AFL, which played the key role behind the ICFTU policy, 
was the most virulently anti-Communist force within the Confedera-
tion. The U. S. federation became distressed in the summer of 1954 
when a number of ICFTU members, including the TUC, did not 
vote against admitting the Soviet Union to the International Labor 
Organization (ILO) (Carew, 1996a, 159).
Tensions within the Confederation rose, however, several months 
prior to the ICFTU’s Vienna Congress at the end of May 1955 when 
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two ITSs, the International Federation of Building and Woodworkers 
and the Miners’ International Federation, accepted the yugoslav trade 
unions’ affiliation. This decision appeared problematic because the 
Confederation did not consider these labor organizations to be “free” 
as outlined in the ICFTU constitution. Because the ITSs operated 
autonomously from the ICFTU, there was little the Confederation 
could do, although the Vienna Congress requested that the ICFTU 
staff attempt to reverse this decision. Moreover, another complicat-
ing factor was that some Western European nations and yugoslavia 
had been exchanging trade union delegations for years (Windmuller, 
1956, 275).
In December 1955, the ICFTU adopted a resolution that urged 
all members of the organization to inform the ICFTU’s General Sec-
retary concerning any invited visits from a “labor delegation” from 
“communist-ruled countries.” The purpose behind this action was 
so that these affiliates “may be fully appraised of the aims and con-
sequences of this communist drive.” The Confederation desired to 
“work all the more effectively in defeating this communist strategy of 
confusion and disruption of the free world labor movement” (Carew, 
2000, 246).
The ICFTU argued that the purpose of invitations from labor orga-
nizations in Communist countries was fourfold: 1) to obtain “moral 
respectability and legitimacy” for the “State Company unions” from 
Communist nations; 2) to fool the workers of the “free world” into 
accepting these labor organizations “as bona fide free trade unions”; 
3) to aid in “communist infiltration and subversion in the free world”; 
and 4) to encourage “the expansionist interests of Soviet imperialism.” 
As such, the ICFTU argued that its affiliates should not engage in 
labor delegation exchange with nations ruled by Communist Parties 
(Carew, 2000, 246).
In spite of manifest violations of this policy, including ICFTU 
Executive Board member Albert Monk of the Australian Council of 
Trade Unions (ACTU) taking a trade union group to Peking in 1957 
(Carew, 2000, 246), three years later the ICFTU’s position remained 
unchanged. In March 1958, the ICFTU reaffirmed the 1955 resolu-
tion approved by its Executive Board (EB). In response to invitations 
to a number of ICFTU affiliates by the Free German Trade Union 
Federation (FDGB), the German Democratic Republic’s “communist-
run trade union organization,” for meetings on May Day 1960 in 
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East Berlin, the ICFTU EB decided to discourage “free trade union 
organizations” from engaging in exchange visits in june 1960 (Carew, 
2000, 299–300).
For the most part, national trade union centers abided by ICFTU 
policy. If there were violations, these came largely from individual 
unions of Confederation affiliates. Even within the virulently anti-
Communist AFL-CIO, there was increasing dissension among mem-
bers, with the National Maritime Union’s President joseph Curran 
visiting the Soviet Union in july 1960 after accepting the Soviet Sea 
and River Workers’ Union’s offer (Windmuller, 1961, 267–268).
With a growing split between the Soviet and Chinese Communist 
Parties and amid the Italian Communist Party calling for the adoption 
of more flexible approaches to local situations by the early 1960s, it was 
clear that the world Communist movement was becoming polycentric. 
Additionally, the WFTU intensified its “unity of action” campaign 
within the trade union movement while Cold War anxieties lessened 
in the aftermath of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. Under such con-
ditions, Western trade unions found it more attractive to engage in 
contacts with their Communist counterparts (Carew, 2000, 299–300). 
One major violator of the policy at this time was the TUC, which in 
1963 sent ten of its General Council members to yugoslavia to exam-
ine the country’s experimentation with worker self-management. In 
addition, the Dutch ICFTU affiliate hosted a small group of Soviet 
trade union leaders in the spring of 1965 (Windmuller, 1966, 361).
Nevertheless, the ICFTU remained firm and clung to its original 
position. In March 1962, the Confederation’s “Sub-Committee on the 
Problem of Relations with Organizations in Dictatorship Countries” 
decided that the EB’s 1955 resolution should remain intact. In March 
1964, the EB reaffirmed its decision that ICFTU affiliates “should not 
associate” with trade unions “within the communist sphere of influ-
ence” because these organizations are “controlled by governments” 
and as such are “government agencies” that cannot be considered to 
be “genuine trade unions” (ICFTU, 1967a, 1–2).
Nine months later, the policy was extended to include Communist-
led trade union federations in the capitalist countries such as the 
French CGT and the Italian CGIL. In December 1964, the ICFTU EB 
extended its policy to discourage its affiliates from interacting with 
“communist-controlled trade unions” such as the “WFTU-affiliated 
organizations in France and Italy.” Also at this time, the EB called for 
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the Confederation to reject cooperation in any manner with any ITS 
that has labor organizations “directly or indirectly affiliated to the 
WFTU.” In February 1966, the Confederation EB reiterated the tenet 
that the goals of “free trade unions” can only be obtained by the “free 
trade union organization themselves” and not through collaboration 
with “communist-controlled organizations.” As such, it was advised that 
the General Secretary remain in close touch with the targeted ICFTU 
members so that “the CGIL–CGT joint moves” would not adversely 
impact the “free trade union movement” (ICFTU, 1967a, 2).
In a june 1966 decision, the Confederation’s EB reaffirmed that 
there is “no mutual interest and no common ground” with regards 
to “the free trade unions” and labor organizations “controlled by 
totalitarian governments and the communist party.” Additionally, the 
General Secretary was called upon to closely monitor the progress 
and endeavors of the WFTU and its Trade Union Internationals with 
respect to its “unity of action” and “dialog” initiatives. Furthermore, it 
called for monitoring the Federation’s functioning in non-Communist 
nations and to keep all ICFTU branches and affiliated groups updated 
concerning WFTU activities. In October 1967, the EB decided to 
end cooperative endeavors between the International Graphical Fed-
eration (IGF) and the ICFTU. Finally, noting that there have been 
“increasing relations” between Confederation members and labor 
organizations in “communist-ruled countries” and/or “communist-
controlled” trade unions, the EB decided that a committee should 
be created for investigating this “problem” and for determining the 
best enforcement strategy for ICFTU policies in this area (ICFTU, 
1967a, 2).
These policies, however, as mentioned earlier, were not accepted 
by all of the Confederation’s members. In February 1964, the British 
TUC’s George Woodcock privately stated that the TUC was favorably 
disposed towards exchanging trade union delegations with the Soviet 
Union as long as these visits pertained only to trade union matters. 
Two years later a TUC delegation accepted the AUCCTU’s invitation 
to visit the Soviet Union. That same year, the West German Federation 
of Trade Unions (DGB), approved the promotion of similar missions 
to Eastern bloc nations (Carew, 2000, 300–1).
An ICFTU-conducted survey in january 1968 indicated that 
affiliates had adopted different positions concerning this issue. For 
example, one group of national affiliates and federations refrained 
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from all relations with WFTU members and would not contemplate 
cooperating with them under any circumstances. France’s Force Ouvri-
ere best characterized this viewpoint, which considered Communism 
to be the “arch enemy of trade unionism,” as did the French General 
Confederation of Cadres (CGC) and the French Confederation of 
Christian Trade Unions. The Canadian Labour Congress, whose pre-
decessor had expelled six Communist Party-led unions, the strongly 
anti-Communist Lebanese Ligue des Syndicats–Unis, and the Inter-
national Federation of Petroleum and Chemical Workers (IFPCW), 
which had always abided by the Confederation policies concerning 
WFTU unions, also expressed the same sentiments (ICFTU, 1968, 
9–10, 13–14).
A second category of ICFTU affiliates had not established a rela-
tionship with WFTU members at the national level, although they 
had permitted their own member unions to establish contact with 
Federation affiliates. The Danish Confederation of Trade Unions 
(LO) represented this position, which at the national level had refused 
invitations from Soviet trade unions, although LO affiliates and local 
branches had visited the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the LO called 
on the ICFTU to allow affiliates discretion on this matter. Another 
national trade union center holding a similar position was the Swiss 
Federation of Trade Unions (SGB), which had no relations with WFTU 
trade unions although SGB members had exchanged delegations 
with trade unions in the Soviet Union, Poland and Czechoslovakia. 
The same stance was maintained by the International Metalworkers’ 
Federation and the Postal, Telegraph and Telephone International, 
which did not meet with WFTU organizations although its affiliates 
had, at times, established contact. Finally, the Miners’ International 
Federation reported that it was its members’ decision to determine 
their level of interaction with WFTU unions (ICFTU, 1968, 8, 11–12, 
14–16).
A third grouping revealed a much more positive view towards the 
WFTU, believing that it was important to cultivate relationships with 
Federation affiliates and/or had actively participated with such organi-
zations in the past and planned to do so again in the future. In France, 
for example, the French Confederation of Democratic Trade Unions 
had closely cooperated with the CGT. The Central Organization of 
Finnish Trade Unions (SAK) epitomized this perspective by engaging 
in exchanges with Soviet trade union delegations on “a regular and 
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frequent basis” and argued that such visits were important in encour-
aging “international understanding and peaceful coexistence.” The 
Austrian Trade Union Federation (OGB) felt the same as the Finns 
and had maintained “loose and friendly contacts” for mutual exchange 
of information through visits, written information, and “observers” at 
trade union congresses with Soviet, Polish, Czechoslovakian, Hungar-
ian, Rumanian and Bulgarian trade unions. The Malaysian Trades 
Union Congress’ delegation had visited the Soviet Union and always 
called for interactions between workers and trade unions throughout 
the world (ICFTU, 1968, 5–8, 9–10).
Finally, japanese unions and union federations took particu-
larly progressive positions on this issue. For example, the japanese 
Confederation of Labor stated that it would contemplate conduct-
ing exchanges with WFTU unions on a case-by-case basis. The japan 
Coalminers’ Union pointed out that it would continue having rela-
tions with the WFTU and its Trades Departments. Additionally, it 
contended that it would carry on with holding exchange visits with 
trade unions regardless of affiliation and/or ideological views. The 
japanese National Federation of Metal Miners’ Unions reported on 
its interactions with Soviet trade union missions, believing that coexis-
tence was important while the japan Postal Workers’ Union (ZENTEI) 
had exchanged delegations since 1957, and claimed that it would 
retain this policy regarding the Soviet Union and Eastern European 
countries (ICFTU, 1968, 2–4).
The Internal Politics of the WFTU, 1964–1973
The WFTU’s internal politics reveals the polycentric nature of the 
organization in the period spanning nearly a decade from the early 
to mid-1960s through the early 1970s. This is a crucial point, given 
that the monolithic nature of Communism was a major ICFTU argu-
ment for its refusal to cooperate with the WFTU. One can ascertain 
the polycentric nature of Communism developing within the Federa-
tion in the early 1960s from the differences of opinion expressed by 
Western European Communists, the Chinese, the Soviets, and other 
nations’ Communists, although the period of most intense internal 
division appeared between 1965 and 1969.
At the 13th WFTU General Council Meeting (October 19–24, 
1964), Western European Communist-led trade union federations 
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criticized the operation of trade unions in the socialist countries. 
Several delegates raised critiques of General Secretary Louis Saillant’s 
report on the WFTU’s policy for defending the global proletariat’s 
interests as outlined by the action program adopted at the organiza-
tion’s fifth World Trade Union Congress. Fernando Santi, the CGIL’s 
Assistant General Secretary, argued that the report failed to adequately 
address how the socialist countries’ trade unions activated the working 
class for achieving particular goals in the construction of socialism; he 
contended that this must be demonstrated more forcefully (ICFTU, 
1967b, 8).
Agostino Novella, the CGIL’s General Secretary, echoed Santi’s 
comments: “The documents of the WFTU devote far too much atten-
tion to a positive assessment of the situation in the socialist countries, 
as well as to the aims which the trade unions in these countries set 
themselves. We are convinced that the documents and the position of 
the WFTU must be in keeping with the impartial and unified character 
which is peculiar to the WFTU.” Five national centers voted against 
Saillant’s report, while the CGIL and the Central Council of Rumanian 
Trade Unions expressed strong criticisms concerning at least one of 
the report’s sections (ICFTU, 1967b, 8).
At the second Plenary Meeting of the World Trade Union Commit-
tee for Consultation and Anti-Monopolistic Unity of Action (Decem-
ber 14–17, 1964), additional critiques arose that the WFTU was 
insufficiently confronting the organization’s most serious problems. 
Concerns surfaced that the organization’s anti-monopoly initiatives 
might lead the WFTU to “lapse into economism” and to overlook 
struggling against the aggressive nature of U. S. imperialism (ICFTU, 
1967b, 9).
For the first time in the WFTU’s history since the 1949 split, 
real conflict emerged within the organization. Although the Soviets 
retained their leading position, during the WFTU Warsaw Congress 
(October 8–22, 1965), the ICFTU predicted that the Soviets would 
experience difficulty in remaining in control because of Chinese and 
Italian opposition. Compared with the past, the Italian CGIL demon-
strated far less interest in WFTU activities and appeared to prefer to 
focus on European topics (ICFTU, 1966b, 1).
According to the Confederation’s report, “the monolithic charac-
ter of the WFTU has been dissipated and the admission that opposition 
exists was one of the most important features of the WFTU Congress” 
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(ICFTU, 1966b, 1). The Soviet delegation walked out twice; the first 
time on October 14 when an Albanian delegate condemned Soviet 
policy and the second time on October 20 in protest of a Chinese 
delegate who assailed the Soviets’ tepid attitude towards Vietnam. 
When a Chinese delegate began to speak one day later, two Soviet 
delegates yelled “go home,” leading to protests from the missions of 
all “Chinese bloc countries” (ICFTU, 1966b, 1–2).
Although most representatives had departed from the conference 
hall when the Albanian delegate, Quimo Quocani, took the floor, he 
argued that “the WFTU was a vassal of Moscow” and that “peaceful 
coexistence” was fundamentally an indication of “cooperation with 
American imperialism.” Sugiri, who represented the Indonesian trade 
union center, SOBSI, strongly criticized Saillant’s and Padilla’s report, 
contending that peaceful coexistence interfered with the struggle 
against imperialism, which only benefitted the United States. Khang 
jung-cha vigorously attacked the conference report, arguing that “a 
“certain” country had turned “the WFTU into an instrument of its 
power politics.” He further condemned the Moscow Agreement for 
banning atomic bomb experiments and claimed “that peaceful co-
existence was diametrically opposed to the expressed will of the work-
ing class.” Finally, Ri jong-Su, the North Korean delegate, declared 
that it was important that, in the future, the WFTU “go on unmasking 
the ICFTU as a henchman of imperialism even more effectively than 
before” (ICFTU, 1967b, 12–13).
The Chinese, Albanian, Indonesian and Korean delegations com-
prised the opposition. Additionally, the Polish, Hungarian and Czecho-
slovakian representatives differentiated themselves slightly from the 
Soviet positions. Furthermore, the Rumanian mission was considered 
to be the Congress’ “enfant terrible” and it was “quietly supported” by 
the yugoslavs who possessed “observer” status (ICFTU, 1966b, 8–9).
The Italian CGIL, the French CGT and the All India Trade Union 
Congress (AITUC) differed in their orientations, while the CGIL 
reported that its delegation was divided concerning retaining affili-
ation with the WFTU (25 in favor, 10 opposed). The CGIL, with the 
CGT’s assent, called for partial independence for the WFTU trade 
departments, flexibility for national trade union centers in their 
application of WFTU policies within a local context, establishment 
of regional organizations and partial autonomy for these structures 
(ICFTU, 1966b, 9).
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In conclusion, the Confederation’s report asserted:
There is no doubt that there have arisen more profound and more evi-
dent differences between the trade union delegations to the Congress from 
communist-ruled countries and those from democratic countries — mainly 
the Italian CGIL, the French CGT and the Indian AITUC. . . . While the 
WFTU pursues its communist political aims, its member organizations in 
democratic countries must also take into consideration the social demands 
of their members. This difference could well be the source of pressure for 
the demand for trade union unity and intended to complement efforts to 
establish “popular fronts” in the political field. (ICFTU, 1966b, 13.)
The political situation remained tense at the WFTU General 
Council Session (December 6–9, 1966). On the first day, open conflict 
emerged between “the pro–Chinese bloc countries” and the WFTU’s 
pro-Soviet leadership. The Albanian representative denounced the 
yugoslavs’ attendance as observers and obtained the Chinese contin-
gent’s full support. During this discussion, the Albanian and Chinese 
representatives attacked the Soviet and yugoslav trade unions. This 
conflict further escalated when Han Hai-ya, the Chinese delegate, 
desired to proceed with his insults directed at the yugoslavs and the 
Soviets. The WFTU President, Renato Bitossi, instructed him to finish 
his pronouncement but when the Chinese representative refused to 
leave the rostrum, Bitossi called for a brief adjournment of the session. 
While the delegates were leaving the conference hall, Hai-ya continued 
speaking until only the Chinese bloc remained (ICFTU, 1966a, 1–2).
On December 7, the Chinese contingent wished to make a state-
ment but “was voted down from the floor.” Although the Chair rec-
ognized another speaker, the Chinese representative continued to 
speak. When he stopped, he still remained on the floor for half an 
hour without uttering a word. Upon the session’s adjournment, the 
Chinese delegate continued his speech while the others exited the 
hall. All in all, the Chinese representatives talked 11 times during 
the session without having been recognized by the Chairman. On 
December 8, the Chinese group in its entirety, including Han Hai-ya, 
was suspended due to its inappropriate behavior during the past two 
days (ICFTU, 1966a, 2).
The decision to suspend the Chinese, however, was not unani-
mous, with the Rumanian, North Vietnamese, the National Libera-
tion Front of South Vietnam, North Korean, Cuban and Venezuelan 
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contingents opposing the resolution, arguing that the suspension 
posed a threat to WFTU unity and could lead to an organizational 
split. In solidarity with the Chinese, the Albanians refused to attend the 
December 8 meeting’s afternoon session. The Hungarians, Czechoslo-
vakians, Polish, Bulgarians and Mongolians backed the anti-Chinese 
proposal, while the Sudanese, Uruguayans and Indians condemned 
the Chinese position (ICFTU, 1966a, 2–3).
Setiati Surasto, the WFTU Secretary, delivered a statement com-
municating his disapproval of the Chinese delegation’s exclusion 
(ICFTU, 1966a, 2). In response to the meeting’s events, Agostino 
Novella, the CGIL General Secretary, remarked that “the situation 
inside the WFTU is certainly very serious, but it is still much too 
early to speak about a definite split” within the organization (ICFTU, 
1967b, 17).
At the WFTU World Economic Conference (December 14–17, 
1966), it was anticipated that the Chinese would stay home because 
of the WFTU General Council Session events earlier in the month. 
They did arrive in Budapest but remained in the hotel rather than 
attending the conference. Additionally, the Albanian, North Korean, 
North Vietnamese, and the National Liberation Front of South Viet-
nam groups refused to appear at the conference hall either (ICFTU, 
1966a, 3).
Members of other delegations attacked these dissidents’ behavior. 
Stoyan Gyurov, President of the Bulgarian trade unions, maintained 
that the Chinese’s attitude “has nothing to do with Marxism– Leninism 
and proletarian internationalism” and “is contrary to the radical inter-
ests of the working class, to the interest of peace and socialism: only 
the imperialist and reactionary forces in the world could be pleased 
with such an activity.” Czechoslovakian, Hungarian, Soviet and East 
German representatives expressed similar sentiments. The CGT, CGIL 
and AITUC referred to the Chinese and Albanian behavior as “mon-
strous injuries against trade union unity” (ICFTU, 1966a, 3–4).
The real reason motivating this dispute appeared to be the Chi-
nese opposition to the constitutional changes mandated at the WFTU 
Congress in Warsaw in October 1965. These modifications included 
granting partial autonomy to several member national centers, in 
addition to allowing the WFTU trade departments, known as Trade 
Union Internationals, to operate more independently as well as decen-
tralizing the WFTU’s structure (ICFTU, 1966a, 4).
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Perhaps the WFTU’s most significant division occurred when five 
Warsaw Pact countries invaded Czechoslovakia in August 1968. With 
the Federation’s headquarters situated in Prague, the WFTU Secretar-
iat could hardly overlook the incursion. While traveling in Hungary at 
the time of the invasion, Louis Saillant, the WFTU’s General Secretary, 
although viewed as an ardent defender of Soviet interests, immediately 
denounced the occupation. Upon request from the Czechoslovakian 
trade unions, Saillant and the WFTU President, the Italian Renato 
Bitossi, sent a protest letter to the Hungarian Trade Union Council 
General Secretary who also served on the WFTU Executive Commit-
tee (Windmuller, 1980, 101–102).
Upon the WFTU Secretariat’s first meeting in Prague after 
the incursion, the body deliberated on Saillant’s statement, the 
Czech unions’ appeal and Saillant and Bitossi’s letter. On August 
28, 1968, the WFTU Secretariat, by a vote of eight to one with the 
only  dissenting vote being that of the Soviet Podzerko, issued a 
communiqué strongly condemning the invasion by the USSR, East 
Germany and the other Warsaw pact nations (Windmuller, 1980, 
102; ICFTU, 1970a). The Secretariat also distributed a proclamation 
which declared in part:
The Secretariat of the WFTU . . . expresses its disapproval of the military 
intervention which contradicts all fundamental principles that form the basis 
of the life of the WFTU and which are freely established by all the national 
centers affiliated to the WFTU. The Secretariat expresses its full solidarity 
to the workers and people of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and pays 
homage to their calm and composure. (Windmuller, 1980, 102.)
After the occupation of Czechoslovakia, differences arose within the 
WFTU. Renato Bitossi, the WFTU president, and Saillant strongly 
opposed the invasion and supported the Czechoslovak trade unions’ 
position that the troops be removed from the country. The Soviet 
trade unions, as well as the labor organizations of the five participating 
nations in the incursion, disagreed. Shelepin attempted to remove 
Bitossi and Saillant but backed down when the CGIL supported Bitossi. 
However, the Soviets later attempted to obtain WFTU backing for the 
mission. Nevertheless, many of the WFTU’s western affiliates refused 
to support this position. In addition, the Rumanian trade unions also 
condemned the military action (ICFTU, 1969).
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The occupation also postponed the WFTU’s 18th General Coun-
cil meeting, moving it from early October 1968 until mid-December 
1968. At this gathering, the Italians, with Rumanian and French sup-
port, advocated for allowing member organizations to become more 
independent of the Soviet and Eastern European trade unions. Addi-
tionally, the Czechoslovakian trade unions took a strong stand against 
the Soviets (ICFTU, 1969).
Although the Soviets maintained control of the WFTU Buda-
pest Congress (October 1969), they were unsuccessful in obtaining 
the WFTU’s withdrawal of its August 28, 1968 statement, which had 
denounced the Czechoslovakian invasion. The Italian CGIL provided 
the main opposition by abstaining from the vote on the major policy 
resolution. China did not attend the Congress (ICFTU, 1970d, 1, 4, 6).
The WFTU Varna Congress (October, 1973) appeared to be 
less contentious than the previous quadrennial WFTU congresses, 
although the Russian trade unions dominated the meeting. The Chi-
nese, once more, were absent. As raised at previous assemblies, only 
the Italians queried why the congress dealt exclusively with the non-
Communist nations (ICFTU, 1973a, 1).
The congress’ theme focused on promoting unity between the 
WFTU, the ICFTU and the World Confederation of Labor (WCL). 
Established at The Hague in 1920, the WCL’s original name was the 
International Federation of Christian Trade Unions (IFCTU). It was 
composed of trade unions connected with the Christian Democratic 
parties of Europe. Because of fascist and Nazi suppression, the confed-
eration disbanded in 1940 and was reestablished upon conclusion of 
the Second World War in 1945. Due to the inclusion of Moslem and 
Buddhist members in African and Asian nations, in 1968 the IFCTU 
renamed itself the WCL (World Confederation of Labour Archives).
According to the opening report of Pierre Gensous, WFTU Gen-
eral Secretary, the document proposed that the WFTU, the ICFTU 
and the WCL should meet, exchange information and work together 
to further European workers’ demands at the second ILO European 
Regional Conference scheduled for january 1974 (ICFTU, 1973a, 
1–2).
The Italians requested the implementation of a new associate 
membership in the WFTU. The CGIL desired to change its status from 
that of full member to associate member in order to promote trade 
union unity in Italy and Western Europe. Although the French CGT 
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opposed associate membership, the Soviet trade unions suggested that 
the CGT also should become an associate member but the French 
rejected this position. The meeting determined that the WFTU Gen-
eral Council’s next session would discuss and determine the rights 
and responsibilities of associate members (ICFTU, 1973a, 2–3).
A Minor Thaw: The ICFTU Policy Changes Concerning Relations 
with Communist-Led Unions
A number of forces led to the ICFTU’s modifications of its policies 
towards Communist nations’ unions by the early 1970s. By 1967–1968, 
many more ICFTU members were conducting bilateral exchanges 
with Eastern bloc trade union federations, and it was believed that 
such contacts would increase unless something was done (Carew, 
2000, 328–329). As a result, the ICFTU EB established a committee 
in October 1967 to examine the complexity of this issue. Not sur-
prisingly, the group was unable to arrive at a solution (Windmuller, 
1976, 255). With the AFL-CIO’s disaffiliation from the ICFTU in 1969 
because it perceived that the European members were becoming 
too soft on Communism, the most anti-Communist force within the 
Confederation, which advocated no contact with the WFTU or its 
members under any circumstances, had departed the organization 
(Windmuller, 1970, 522–3). Although the committee became dormant 
after the AFL-CIO’s withdrawal, it was reactivated and issued a report 
which the ICFTU EB adopted at its Vienna meeting in july 1973. The 
document essentially acknowledged the ICFTU’s schism over this issue 
and equally respected the positions of affiliates who had, and those 
who had refused, exchanges, with Communist countries’ labor orga-
nizations. As such, the committee concluded that each trade union 
center had to determine its own policy on this matter, depending on 
its own situation (Windmuller, 1976, 254).
Because of détente and various ICFTU national trade union cen-
ters meeting with WFTU members, the Confederation modified its 
policy. The organization as a whole, however, as stated in a 1973 report, 
refused to enter into “any relationship with international or regional 
bodies whose policies are in diametrical conflict with free and demo-
cratic trade union objectives.” The report continued to argue that the 
rationale behind the “WFTU’s world labor unity campaign” was only 
to help achieve “Soviet foreign policy aims” (Windmuller, 1980, 82). 
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Thus, in 1973 the ICFTU still willingly emphasized anti-Communism 
over class interests.
In spite of its position, a preliminary meeting was held in Vienna 
in 1973 between WFTU officials representing the national trade union 
centers of the Soviet Union, Hungary and East Germany with the “ICF-
TU’s Big Three” (Great Britain, West Germany and Sweden) where 
they agreed to hold a “consultative meeting” of European trade union 
officials within the confines of the ILO’s Regional European Confer-
ence (Windmuller, 1976, 255). As mentioned earlier, that meeting 
convened in january 1974 during the Second European Conference 
of the ILO, the first time such a gathering took place since the WFTU’s 
1949 split. Although the two organizations’ general secretaries met 
informally at the conference, the ICFTU’s pronouncement with what 
had occurred was bizarre; it argued that neither it nor the WFTU had 
been formally “represented at the meeting.” Subsequent assemblies 
between European affiliates of the ICFTU, WFTU and WCL took 
place in 1975 and 1977 concerning “the work environment, the use 
of dangerous substances and products in industry, and trade union 
education and training” (Windmuller, 1980, 82–3).
The WFTU’s Class Appeals to the ICFTU 
During the 1960s and 1970s
Although the WFTU had always desired engaging in unified action 
with the ICFTU, as has already been demonstrated in this article, 
the Confederation would have nothing to do with the WFTU; anti- 
Communism clearly exerted more influence on its organizational 
practices than class-based appeals. This occurred even though the Con-
federation shared common interests with the Federation throughout 
the 1950s and 1960s with regards to the “dangers inherent in increased 
Cold War militarism, the need to oppose apartheid, the importance 
of improving the rights of female workers worldwide, and the need 
to utilize the growing number of intergovernmental organizations” 
(Myconos, 2005, 42).
The WFTU’s attempts at achieving “working class unity” intensi-
fied during the early 1960s. For example, at this time, it organized 
conferences, designed to attract Confederation affiliates, “of Latin 
American plantation workers in Havana, Pacific and Asian dockwork-
ers in Tokyo; port, transport and fishery workers in Budapest and 
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in the mid-sixties those on the theme of ‘Solidarity with the North 
Vietnamese’” (Carew, 2000, 300; Windmuller, 1980, 107).
 By 1970, the WFTU’s efforts towards achieving international 
class unity deepened, with attempts to organize a joint European 
trade union conference with the ICFTU. An August 25, 1970 letter 
from Ignacy Loga-Sowinski, President of the Central Council of Trade 
Unions in Poland, to ICFTU and WCL European trade union affili-
ates, called for the convening of a European trade union conference 
because of the common class interests confronting European workers:
In many European countries various steps are being taken with a view to 
regulate economy. These are e.g. programming, promoting of investments, 
income policies, various social and economic reforms are put into effect 
and they are all of immediate concern to the vitally important interests of 
the working people. The working class and its trade union organizations are 
facing up to new duties concerning the raising and defending standard of 
living; improving labour conditions; solving problems of employment; vo-
cational training; insurance and social securities; safeguarding trade union 
rights. (ICFTU, 1970c, 2.)
Furthermore, two months later, at the WFTU General Council’s 
20th Session (Moscow, October 13–16, 1970), the Federation realized 
that international class unity was necessary for achieving the workers’ 
class interests on a global basis. Due to the increasing internation-
alization of capital, the Federation referred to divisions within the 
international trade union movement as seeming “like relics from a 
by-gone age, incompatible with today’s requirements.” Noting that 
“in every country where there is trade union division, unity of action 
has been developed more and more to defend the workers’ common 
interests more effectively,” the WFTU called for unification of labor 
on the international level. WFTU President Pierre Gensous put forth 
the same argument in a November 1970 letter to ICFTU President 
Harm Buiter (ICFTU, 1970b).
Conclusion: Whither the WFTU and the ICFTU?
The ICFTU’s virulent anti-Communism prevented it from work-
ing with the WFTU, even though the Federation continually made 
class appeals towards working with the Confederation. And while the 
WFTU was polycentric since the mid-1960s, which the Confederation 
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knew was the case, the ICFTU still refused to work with the Fed-
eration, contending that it was a monolithic organization. Even the 
WFTU Secretariat’s condemnation of the invasion of Czechoslovakia 
had no effect on changing the Confederation’s attitude towards the 
Federation. And while there was a thaw in the relationship between 
the WFTU and the ICFTU from the early to late 1970s, it was a tenta-
tive, hesitant and minor one at best, and failed to result in the two 
international organizations collaborating on joint projects in any 
meaningful manner.
Given the ICFTU’s nature, this is hardly surprising. Although 
there were many Confederation affiliates that were ostensibly social-
ist in orientation, the organization as a whole was not. Marcel 
van der Linden (2000, 530) has noted that while the IFTU had 
used Marxist vocabulary and called for capitalism’s abolition, “the 
ICFTU never made any such statements.” Although the Confedera-
tion initially interpreted political democracy to be “parliamentary 
democracy” combined with “free collective bargaining” (530), the 
ICFTU thought that this political democracy might correspond 
with a “third way,” an economic system that was neither capitalist 
nor Communist. But finding a middle ground between “Stalin and 
Standard Oil” (in Walter Reuther’s words at the ICFTU’s founding 
convention in 1949) never materialized. In spite of the Confedera-
tion protesting against the increasing economic strength and power 
of transnational corporations, van der Linden makes clear that 
the ICFTU consciously chose its side: “The ICFTU opted clearly 
for capitalism . . . and the Western military bloc, including NATO” 
(van der Linden, 2000, 531).
van der Linden’s position receives additional support from more 
recent scholarship by Garcia (2010, 289–290). She argues that the 
ICFTU’s position from 1949 to 1969 can best be characterized as one 
of “labor liberalism,” although the organization cannot be described 
as a “working-class movement” as such. Rather, according to Garcia 
(2010, 290), the ICFTU represented a “multi-class movement” reflect-
ing the views and policies of politicians, business leaders, the working 
class and the poor. Thus, if the ICFTU actually embodied a “multi-
class movement” that was responsible for balancing the perspectives 
of various class forces, it is hardly surprising that it would be unwilling 
to align with the WFTU that perceived itself as defending only the 
interests of a single class, the proletariat.
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And although there is no doubt that the WFTU often defended 
the Soviets’ interests (despite its opposition to the 1968 Czechoslova-
kian invasion), the cataclysmic events of 1989 to 1991, which led to 
the destruction of the Eastern European socialist states and the Soviet 
Union, demonstrated that the WFTU had a life of its own after the 
Cold War, in spite of suffering significant defections in Eastern Europe. 
The Federation survives into the 21st century’s second decade, largely 
representing trade union movements in the global South, vigorously 
challenging neoliberal economic policies (Herod, 2009, 211–213) while 
still strongly committed in its struggle against global capitalism and 
imperialism. The WFTU is perhaps the only international organization 
connected with the former Soviet Union that remains extant. Even after 
the socialist nations’ disappearance in the early 1990s, the ICFTU still 
refused to cooperate with labor organizations that remained affiliated 
with the WFTU. Thus, with the Confederation still possessing a Cold 
War attitude towards the Federation after its side allegedly won, one 
might wonder what truly motivated the ICFTU in a world where official 
Communism barely existed after 1991.
While the WFTU retained close ties to the Soviet Union and per-
haps, as the Italian CGIL argued, did not do enough to defend the 
rights of workers in the socialist nations even given the constraints that 
existed, this does not mean that the working classes in capitalist nations 
would not have potentially benefitted from the ICFTU’s collaboration 
with the WFTU. The ICFTU’s anti-Communism overrode any appeals 
to class unity in determining its policy toward the WFTU. And the job 
of the successor organization, the International Trade Union Con-
federation, formed through the merger of the ICFTU and the WCL 
on November 1, 2006, in defending the international proletariat’s 
class interests has hardly become easier in a post-Communist world.
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ARCHIVAL SOURCES
A portion of the citations in this paper contain archival sources that can be found in 
the International Confederation of Free Trade Union Archives at the International 
Institute of Social History in Amsterdam (the Netherlands). The author thanks the 
staff at this library and archives for their help during the author’s research visit.
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ICFTU: International Confederation of Free Trade Union Archives, International 
Institute of Social History, Amsterdam. 
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